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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme * J.H w*^~ matter pursuant 
to Utah Code And. "i '8- 2-2 { I ,• i I I'/I " i 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
I. W h e t h e r a a HI 11 > s 11111 111 1 11«I« 11l!' evidence regarding the 
Zions litigation was prejudicial ertui. 
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court's 
ruling was clear i» » PIIUIKMIII!., Whitehead v, 
American Motors Sales Corp, , 801 »'" ,"«! M <""<I {III.\it 
II. Whether the nil Lii ii-.k-fll - • k. U M K I 1 hetween these 
T^*-^ required written notice of default as a condit ton 
precede. . , .ma; or implied breach of the lease, 
barring MLL's contract «_,«* 
Standard of Review: De novo review for 
corr ecti less. Kimball u Campbell, 699 P.2d 7 14 
(Utah 1985). 
ill iWhether the 19 BO Amended Ground Lease, by its terms, 
provided tiutit i i MJ*I '«,'« pi n|i i biting Middlet.ons from, 
interfering w . " I -ir requiring l luiti " .i no MLL 
"I i'lop the subiect property. 
Standard m Review, bu iiuvj" review for 
correctness. Kimball v, Campbell, supid. 
I"" "' Whf'il hir-i" the tihil t ourt erreii as a matter of lav v" 
awarding MLL attorneys fc^f- ii MI»H i n'Mini failed ^ 0 specify a 
Plaintiff/Appellee will be referred to herein as MLTf 
finding of a breach of the express terms of the 1980 Amended 
Ground Lease. 
Standard of Review; De novo review for 
correctness. Cottonwood Mall v. Sine, 830 P.2d 
266 (Utah 1992). 
V. Whether the trial court erred by ruling that, as a 
matter of law, all defendants were jointly and severally liable 
on the breach of contract claims, even though they leased the 
property as tenants in common and did not expressly agree to 
joint liability. 
Standard of Review; De novo review for 
correctness. Kimball v. Campbell, supra. 
VI. Whether MLL failed to present substantial evidence to 
establish that threats of litigation by Anthony W. Middleton, Jr. 
caused damage to MLL. 
Standard of Review; Whether there is any 
substantial evidence from which the jury 
could have reasonably reached the verdict 
without resorting to speculation or drawing 
unreasonable inferences. Morgan v. 
Quailbrook Condominium Co.. 704 P.2d 573 
(Utah 1985). 
VII. Whether, as a matter of law, a threat of litigation not 
followed by suit and adjudication favorable to MLL is legally 
sufficient to satisfy the "improper purpose and improper means" 
element of MLL's tortious interference claim. 
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Standard of Review: itn novo review for 
' 11 - rec t, me * :•- Uchail * , UMCl..»."'or p „ i" 00 I'.^d 1068 
(Utah 1985). 
Villi Whether the* ti" ia. I o u r t e r r e d in f a i l i n g t o r u l e a s a 
m a t t e r 'J" ! • • • • • •"" , ^ l l c ' i k ," •• MLI and i-.u^iers of 
t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y in q u e s t i o n , were p r i v i l e g e * 1 in i ni.ui J » 
nerjnl' inl MUM I HI s u b l e a s e of t h e p r o p e r t y . 
Standard of Review: iur 
correctness Scharf v. BMG Corp,, supra. 
IX. t "hi i i',1 instructions erroneously stated *-*-•->. 
applicable law respecting daroafje? • H M < i,v r.ormiM • nn a iiouL^e 
recovery and relieving HT,I mi its duty to mitigate. 
bLanUiAi J ui Reviei i• novo r ev iew f or 




-•'-••. i i . | Courts open • Redress of injuries ] 
All courts shall be open, and e ver y pcj.0w«. . _ injury 
done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without 
denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any -v-H1 « • • *-o which he is a party. 
B. Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 403 Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds „ 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of The Case. 
This action arises out of a landlord-tenant relationship 
which has existed between plaintiff and defendants since 1975. 
It is the second major lawsuit which the lease between the 
parties has spawned. The plaintiff in this action, Medical 
Leasing, Ltd. (lfMLL") is the lessee of a 10-acre parcel of land 
on the northwest corner of 39th South and 7th East in Salt Lake 
City. Defendants (collectively, "Middletons") are the fee owners 
of the property and landlords to MLL. The instant case arose 
when consummation of a sublease which MLL had been negotiating 
with The Boyer Company for some eighteen months was allegedly 
prevented or interfered with by conduct of defendant Anthony W. 
Middleton, Jr. MLL had demanded certain amendments and 
concessions from Middletons to facilitate the Boyer sublease and 
when they were not forthcoming, threatened to sue and then 
ultimately commenced this action. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below, 
On February 16, 1990, Medical Leasing filed this action. R. 
at 2. The original Complaint had five claims. Count I prayed 
for a declaratory judgment and injunction. Count II was a claim 
for breach of implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing in 
the 1980 Amended Ground Lease between the parties. Count III was 
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for intentional interference with contract. Count IV was for 
intentional interference with prospective economic relations, and 
Count V was for attorney's fees under the Amended Ground Lease, 
All of the claims were asserted against the other Middletons on 
the basis that Anthony Middleton acted as an agent of the other 
Middletons; no separate claim of joint and several liability was 
made. Complaint, R. at 2-26. 
Following defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the trial court 
dismissed Count I, finding that the Middletons had no contractual 
obligation to consent to attornment or to the proposed Boyer 
sublease. R. 301-2. (the Order is included in Appellants' 
Addendum as Exhibit 1). Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (R. 
319) including all the original claims except those for 
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The claims again 
asserted the other Middletons were liable because Anthony 
Middleton acted as their agent; again, no separate claim of joint 
and several liability was made. 
Defendants moved for summary judgment. R. at 447, 584. The 
court granted summary judgment against plaintiff only on its 
second claim, for intentional interference with the development 
contract. The court held as a matter of law that there was no 
contract between Boyer Company and MLL which could be the subject 
of an interference claim as it had expired by its own terms. R. 
at 1078. (See, Appellants' Addendum, Exhibit 2). The case 
proceeded to trial on the remaining claims. 
- 5 -
Over defendants' objections, the Court admitted evidence at 
trial which Middletons assert should have been excluded, 
including, among other things: evidence about the Middletons7 
claims in prior litigation involving Zions Bank, inferring that 
it was not meritorious, even though that action was settled and 
compromised. Objections: Motion in Limine, R. at 1215-17; Trial 
Transcript, R. at 4007, 4024, 4042, 4114, 4115. 
Defendants objected to various jury instructions given by 
the Court, including: 
a. the elements of intentional interference with 
prospective relations and privileges associated therewith; 
b. submission of any issue of breach of express 
contract or implied covenant of good faith; 
c. the plaintiff's duty of mitigation; and 
d. the analysis and calculation of damages. 
The jury returned a verdict,2 finding: 
a. Anthony Middleton and Carol Middleton tortiously 
and intentionally interfered with Medical Leasing's 
prospective economic relations [R. at 1569]; and 
b. Anthony and Carol Middleton breached "the express 
terms of the Amended Ground Lease and/or their implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing." [R. at 1572]. 
The jury found compensatory damages in the amount of 
$2,582,780 (R. at 1574), which is the present value of all of the 
The Special Verdict was incorporated in the Judgment which is 
included in Appellants' Addendum as Exhibit 6. 
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l e a s e payments t o be made by Boyer t o Medical Leasing under the 
proposed sublease for i t s f u l l term as though t h e i r l e a s e were 
signed and in e f f e c t . 
The jury found the other Middletons did not t o r t i o u s l y 
i n t e r f e r e with p l a i n t i f f ' s prospect ive economic r e l a t i o n s (R. at 
1569-70) , and did not breach the l e a s e or any covenant of good 
f a i t h . R. a t 1572-73. 
After t r i a l , the t r i a l court he ld , as a matter of law: 
a. that ne i ther the Lease nor the law required MLL t o 
g ive Middletons wri t ten no t i ce of the a l l e g e d breach of the 
Lease before claiming defaul t under the Lease; 
b. there was subs tant ia l evidence tha t paragraph 8 of 
the Amended Ground Lease was breached (R. a t 2944, 1. 9 -13 ) ; 
c . that a l l defendants were j o i n t l y l i a b l e under the 
Lease for Anthony M i d d l e t o n s breach of the Lease and/or 
breach of the covenant of good f a i t h and f a i r deal ing (R. at 
2962); and 
d. that p l a i n t i f f was e n t i t l e d t o at torneys f e e s 
under the Lease for defendants' breach of the Lease, in the 
amount of $275,000. R. a t 2941-42.3 (See. Appel lants ' 
Addendum, Exhibit 6.) 
3
 Middletons reserved t h e i r r ight t o contest MLL's claim for at torneys ' 
f ees and t o contest the award of fees and/or the amount of fees for MLL's 
f a i l u r e t o "al locate time and fees for (1) successful claims for which there 
may be an ent i t lement t o attorney f e e s , (2) unsuccessful claims for which 
there would have been an enti t lement t o attorney fees had the claims been 
succes s fu l , and (3) claims for which there i s no ent i t lement t o attorney 
f e e s . " R. at 2951. 
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The jury found in special interrogatories that (a) Anthony 
and Carol4 Middleton had (i) intentionally interfered with MLL's 
prospective economic relationship with The Boyer Company (R. at 
1569) and (ii) breached the express terms of the lease and/or the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing (R. at 1572), (b) the 
other Middletons did not interfere (R. at 1569-70) or breach the 
lease (R. at 1572-73), and (c) MLL should recover punitive 
damages from Anthony Middleton. R. at 1574. The jury found 
damages to MLL in the amount of $2,582,780 (R. at 1574) and at a 
separate hearing, punitive damages of $75,000. R. at 1584. (See. 
Appellants/ Addendum, Exhibit 6.) 
Following the jury's verdict, Judge Rigtrup ruled that all 
Middletons were jointly liable for the breach of lease by Anthony 
and Carol Middleton. R. at 2962. After denying defendants' 
Motions for JNOV or a New Trial, the Court entered judgment in 
favor of MLL against all Middletons jointly on the claim of 
breach of lease and/or breach of covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing and against Anthony and Carol Middleton on the claim of 
intentional interference with prospective economic relationship, 
Min the amount of $2,582,780, together with interest thereon at 
the rate of 10% per annum from and after February 28, 1992 to the 
date of judgment . . . and thereafter at the rate of 12% per 
annum," for attorney's fees ,fin the amount of $275,000 together 
with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from and after the 
Carol Middleton'8 liability was based on a finding that her husband, 
Tony Middleton, was her agent. 
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date judgment i s en te red ," and c o s t s . R. a t 2964. (See, 
Appel lants ' Addendum, Exhibit 6.) I t i s from t h i s Judgment t h a t 
Middletons appeal . 
STATEMENT OF PACTS 
Middletons are the owners as tenants in common5 of 10 acres 
of r e a l property a t the corner of 7th East and 39th South in Sal t 
Lake City. The property was previously owned sole ly by R. P. 
Middleton, Anthony W. Middleton, Sr. and Delores Middleton, 
brothers and s i s t e r . R. P. Middleton gave h i s i n t e r e s t in the 
property t o h i s chi ldren , R. G. Middleton (R. a t 4972), Mary 
Middleton Dahl and Victor ia Ann Stearn, and R. G. ' s wife, Jane. 
Anthony W. Middleton, Sr. gave h i s i n t e r e s t in the property to 
h i s sons, Anthony W. Middleton, J r . (R. a t 4317) and George W. 
Middleton, and t h e i r wives,6 Carol and Jean. Delores Middleton, 
who i s a r e s iden t of the D i s t r i c t of Columbia (R. a t 321, J 9, 
412, J 9 ) , has re ta ined her i n t e r e s t in the property. 
In 1975, the Middletons leased the r e a l t y t o MLL's 
predecessor u n t i l the year 2025, with a 30-year option for 
renewal. The tenant proposed to construct a surg ica l center on 
two acres of the proper ty . The Middletons consented to 
subordinate7 t o the construct ion lender t h e i r fee i n t e r e s t in the 
Ownership as tenants in common was a l leged in the Amended Complaint, 
I I 5-13, R. at 321-22, and admitted in Middletons' answers, R. at 391-92 and 
412. See, a l s o . R. at 899, 1. 16-18. 
6
 George and Jean Middleton have s ince divorced. 
7
 The or ig ina l Ground Lease in 1975 s ta ted: "Tenant has represented t o 
Landlord that i t w i l l be impossible for i t to finance the construct ion of the 
Surgical Center without the subordination of the Landlord of i t s fee t i t l e t o 
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two acres where the surgical center would be built. Ex. P-l at 
9-14. The lease also provided that "Landlord does not agree to 
subordinate the fee title of any of the Lease Property except as 
to the two acres referred to above.11 Id. at 14. 
An Amended Ground Lease between MLL and Middletons (Ex. P-
3), made in 1980, provided for a term to July 31, 2025 with a 15-
year option to renew. In that Amended Ground Lease, Middletons 
agreed to subordinate an additional .75 acre to facilitate 
construction of an addition to the surgical center. Ex. P-3 at 
7-12 (the 1980 Amended Ground Lease is included in Appellants' 
Addendum as Exhibit 7). 
Each of the Middletons signed the Amended Ground Lease 
("Lease") separately as "Landlord". 
Middletons believed they would be able to participate in 
further development rentals because they understood that if MLL 
did undertake to sublease the rest of the property to a major 
independent developer, as a practical matter, the developer or 
the developer's lender would very likely insist that MLL obtain 
the Middletons' agreement to subordinate the fee to the 
development lender's lien (R. at unnumbered page following 5701) 
and/or to the developer's or his subtenant's leaseholds, or 
require other consent or changes in the lease. R. at 4998-99, 
5001-2, 5004. The Middletons anticipated that if MLL asked for 
consent or subordination for development, they could rightfully 
ask for more income on the Lease in return. R. at 5004. In one 
the two acres . . ." Ex. P-l at 10. 
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sense MLL had a similar view: if MLL asked Middletons for 
consent, they knew Middletons would ask for more money. R. at 
4916. 
In 1980, MLL subleased part of the undeveloped portion of 
the property to Zions Bank. Ex. P-4. The sublease included a 
right to cure provision, which mirrored the provision in the 
Lease: 
In the event Lessor receives any notice of any default 
under said Amended Ground Lease, Lessor shall promptly, 
no later than three (3) days from the receipt of said 
notice by Lessor, deliver to Lessee a copy of said 
notice. Lessee may elect, in its sole discretion, to 
cure said default on behalf of Lessor and thereby 
reinstate and continue in effect said Amended Ground 
Lease. In the event Lessee remedies any such default . 
• • [Lessor is responsible for Lessee's costs.] 
Ex. P-4, f 15. 
Although the Middletons were not asked to subordinate their 
fee, Zions insisted the Middletons expressly consent to Zions 
sublease and MLL insisted that such consent be given without 
compensation. Ex. P-6. Zions, over MLL's objections (R. at 
4161), sued MLL and the Middletons for consent or a declaration 
that consent was not necessary. Zions Utah Bancorooration v. 
Medical Leasing Limited, et al.. in the Third District Court of 
Utah, Civil No. C83-713. See. Zions Complaint, Ex. P-10. In 
October, 1985, the parties reached a settlement by which MLL paid 
the Middletons $21,000 (Ex. P-17, pp. 4-5, 5-9) and the parties 
agreed to a mutual release of all claims and a stipulation that 
restated paragraph 8 of the 1980 Amended Ground Lease. Ex. P-16 
pp. 4-5 (the Zions Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
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Order, including the Stipulation, are included in Appellants' 
Addendum as Exhibit 8). 
In 1987, MLL began to discuss further development of the 
remaining property with The Boyer Company. R. at 4050. Because 
MLL did not want to share any proceeds from such development with 
the owners of the land, neither MLL nor Boyer disclosed the 
proposed development to the Middletons until late July of 1989. 
Dr. Wong, R. at 4894-95. 
In June, 1988, MLL and Boyer Company signed a development 
agreement (Ex. P-22) whereby Boyer Company contemplated the 
sublease and development of the remaining six acres, conditioned, 
among other things, upon Boyer Company getting the property . 
rezoned for a commercial use and the parties signing a sublease 
by December 31, 1988. This development agreement specified the 
exact rents Boyer Company would pay MLL over the 52-year term, 
including escalation based on the higher of consumer price index 
increases or the increases in rents Boyer Company might receive 
from subtenants over a stated baseline. Later, the time within 
which the sublease was to be signed was extended to January 31, 
1989. Ex. P-32. 
The Boyer Company obtained rezoning and "was prepared to 
remove the contingencies of the Development Agreement1* (Ex. P-
32), but MLL failed to prepare the first draft of the proposed 
sublease until February 3, 1989, three days after the development 
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agreement had expired by i t s terms. Ex. D-30.8 After examining 
the proposed sublease on March 14, 1989, Boyer Company's lawyer 
Vic Taylor wrote MLL's lawyer John Parsons that a number of 
"business hurdles" had t o be overcome (Ex. D-14), before 
addressing other concerns with the proposed sublease . The 
"business hurdles" t o overcome included: 
(1) that ty ing the rent t o MLL in part on Boyer's 
r e n t a l s from subtenants "v io la te s the l e t t e r and s p i r i t " of 
the provis ion in paragraph 8 of the Amended Ground Lease 
under which MLL could sublease without Middleton consent , 
and that "the Sublessee i s unwi l l ing t o take the r i s k of 
such v i o l a t i o n , the r e s u l t of which could be termination" of 
the Amended Ground Lease; 
(2) that MLL must obtain Middleton consent t o the 
Boyer Company sublease; and 
(3) that MLL and the Middletons must again amend the 
Amended Ground Lease to provide that i f MLL defaul ted on the 
ground l e a s e , the Middletons would "attorn" t o Boyer Company 
and perform MLL's o b l i g a t i o n s t o Boyer Company9 under the 
sublease and accept Boyer Company's performance of i t s 
8
 The t r i a l court, rul ing on defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, 
s p e c i f i c a l l y concluded tha t , as a matter of law, the development agreement 
between MLL and Boyer expired by i t s terms on January 31, 1989. R. at 1078. 
See, Appel lants ' Addendum, Exhibit 2 . 
This attornment provis ion would impose MLL's dut ies t o Boyer Company 
on Middletons. Under the Lease, Middletons are not required t o do so . See, 
d i scuss ion in Point V of the Brief f i l e d by co-defendants. 
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obligation under the sublease or by any sublessee of or 
lender to Boyer. 
MLL objected to Boyer making requests of the Middletons for 
such concessions, anticipating that Middletons would ask for more 
money. R. at 4170. MLL's position was that Boyer Company's 
lawyer was wrong on the first two points; it refused to change 
the rent clause and said that Boyer Company ought to be content 
with the "right to cure" clause which Zions had accepted, rather 
than the attornment clause Boyer demanded. MLL believed and 
MLL's lawyer wrote to Boyer Company on April 10, 1989 that the 
Middletons would find Boyer's requests unreasonable. R. at 4399, 
Ex. D-15. MLL insisted that Boyer Company was legally bound by 
the development agreement to sign the proposed sublease without 
material changes and threatened suit if necessary to force that 
result. R. at 4570; 4199. 
In May, 1989, in an effort to mollify MLL, Boyer Company 
explained to its mortgage broker, Bonneville Mortgage Company, 
the nature of the proposed transaction and asked if financing 
could be arranged. Banks, R. at 5396. Boyer Company's mortgage 
broker asked its legal counsel, Greg Bell, for an opinion 
respecting the "financeability of the proposed arrangement," and 
If, in your professional opinion the proposed 
ground lease(s) are not acceptable to our investors, 
please so advise at your earliest convenience so that 
we can so advise our client. 
Ex. D-17. 
Greg Bell advised Bonneville Mortgage Company and Boyer 
Company that Middletons' consent and attornment, inter alia, 
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would be required by a lender, and that the proposed transaction 
was likely too complicated to be financed at all. Mr. Bell 
agreed with Mr. Taylor's opinions set forth in Taylor's letter of 
March 14, 1989. Ex. D-14, Ex. D-18. 
On July 25, 1989, Drs. Ring, Wong and Adair and their 
lawyer, John Parsons, met with Roger Boyer, his lawyer, Vic 
Taylor, and Greg Gardner. R. 4116. They discussed the concerns 
Vic Taylor had previously expressed, which are identified in his 
March 14, 1989 letter. Parsons, R. at 4531. Dr. Ring 
interrupted and declared "we are not going to the Middletons.H 
Id. at 4532. According to Dr. Ring, Boyer said "we can work 
around that," (Dr. Ring, R. at 4121, 1. 5-6) and that Boyer 
wanted "to make a deal, not break a deal." R. at 4121.10 
Although the Amended Ground Lease directed that all rents 
and notices be sent to Dr. Richard P. Middleton for all of the 
Middletons, Boyer, nevertheless, wanted to speak with Dr. Anthony 
(Tony) Middleton, whom he knew personally, about the project. R. 
4122. MLL continued to insist that the sublease go forward 
without contacting the Middletons at all. Boyer stated to MLL at 
the July 25, 1989 meeting that he was concerned about getting 
into a "litigation box," — that is, he feared he would be sued 
whether he contacted the Middletons or not. R. 4121. 
Middletons objected to Dr. Ring's hearsay testimony on this subject. 
A lengthy bench conference was held on the objection and the court heard 
specific argument but eventually allowed the testimony. R. at 4057-4059, 
4060-4082, 4105f 4112. 
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Finally, MLL reluctantly acquiesced and agreed Boyer could 
talk to Tony Middleton. R. at 4298, Boyer contacted Tony 
Middleton in late July of 1989 (R. at 5530) to tell him of the 
proposed development and to seek assurance that the Middletons 
would not sue. This was the first time any of the Middletons 
knew of the negotiations between MLL and Boyer Company (R. at 
4895, 4981, and 5530) which had been going on for almost two 
years. Tony Middleton told his cousin, Dr. Richard G. Middleton 
("R.G.'1), of the conversation with Boyer. R. at 4981. MLL's Dr. 
Harry Wong, who worked daily in the same hospital with R.G., told 
R.G. that Boyer was going to develop the property without 
subordination, that Roger Boyer was going to talk to Tony 
Middleton about it in a few days and asked if R.G. wanted to 
attend. R. at 4895, 4909. R.G. told Dr. Wong that his presence 
was not necessary if subordination were not required (id.) and 
said that Tony did not speak for the other two-thirds of the 
Middleton family. R. at 4910. Dr. Wong acknowledged this 
conversation and admitted that he knew that the rest of the 
Middleton family sometimes disagreed with Tony. R. at 4910. 
On August 7 or 8, 1989, Boyer met with Tony Middleton. 
Boyer told Tony that his lawyers were of the opinion that the 
Middletons' consent to the sublease was needed and that Boyer was 
of the same opinion. R. 5534; R. 5601. Boyer also told Tony that 
MLL had threatened to sue Boyer Company if it didn't proceed with 
the project. R. 5539, 5540. 
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Other meetings were held among Tony# Boyer and MLL 
representatives. At those meetings, Tony Middleton stated he was 
in favor of Boyer developing the property and when asked to 
assure that the Middletons would not sue, said he believed the 
Middletons would agree not to contest the contract in court in 
exchange for more rent. R. at 4463. He said: 
Basically that, in my opinion, that if this project, 
with The Boyer Company, was not appropriately dealt 
with so that all parties involved were appropriately 
part of the project, that it would inevitably lead to 
future litigation by this generation of the Middleton 
family or by subsequent generations of the Middleton 
family. 
R. at 5543. 
Dr. Wally Ring characterized Tony Middleton's statement more 
graphically, suggesting that: "If a stake goes in the ground, the 
Middletons will sue." R. at 4126-27. After this September 26, 
1989 meeting, Tony Middleton recorded his impressions of the 
meeting in his diary. Ex. P-37. In October and early November, 
1989, Drs. Ring and Wong discussed with Tony Middleton the 
possibility of MLL paying the Middletons $10,000 to $25,000 in 
exchange for the Middletons' cooperation in providing Boyer an 
acceptable sublease arrangement. R. at 4135-44, 4926-34, 5546-
48. Ultimately, however, MLL refused to pay the Middletons any 
money. Dr. Ring, moreover, verbally threatened Tony Middleton 
with suit if the Middletons would not amend the 1980 Amended 
Ground Lease. He told Tony Middleton that MLL had a $100,000 war 
chest in reserve for such a suit. R. at 4144-45, 5552. Dr. Ring 
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testified that Tony Middleton also threatened to sue in these 
October and November meetings• R. at 4141-44• 
On November 17, 1989, MLL wrote to Anthony Middleton, 
threatening suit if the Middletons did not amend the 1980 Amended 
Ground Lease to provide an attornment clause, give further 
consent to the Boyer sublease and agree to other concessions 
asked by Boyer's lawyer in his March 14, 1989 letter. Ex. P-39. 
When Anthony's lawyer asked for a copy of the proposed sublease 
to consider approving it (Ex. D-31), MLL refused to provide it 
unless the Middletons first agreed not to ask for more rent and 
not to sue. Ex. P-42. 
Also on November 17, 1989, MLL wrote Boyer Company 
threatening suit if Boyer did not sign the proposed sublease in 
10 days and stating that Anthony's "threats of litigation" "as a 
representative of the Middleton family" were unfounded. Ex. P-
40. 
Boyer's lawyer responded twice, first writing that "The 
Boyer Company does not view the threats made by Tony Middleton as 
'without basis in law or fact . . .'" Ex. D-30. He later wrote 
on February 5, 1990 that Boyer was not bound to sign the sublease 
because the Development Agreement had expired months before and 
Boyer was terminating negotiations because "Medical Leasing has 
been unable to obtain the necessary cooperation of the landowner 
to make the ground lease financeable." Ex. D-39. 
At a meeting on February 15, 1990, MLL's Dr. Ring continued 
to ask Boyer if he would not be satisfied with a right to cure 
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clause, as Zions had accepted, instead of the attornment clause 
Boyer's lawyer wanted; But Boyer still did not agree to go 
forward. He said his lawyer would have to review it. Ex. D-58. 
The Amended Ground Lease requires a defaulting party to pay 
the prevailing party's attorney's fees. It specifically provides 
that a party is not in default until 30 days after written notice 
from the other specifying the particulars on which a party has 
failed to perform and those particulars remain unrectified for 
that period. Ex. P-3, I 8, p. 6-7 (See, Appellants' Addendum, 
Exhibit 7). It further requires notice to the landlord be given 
by certified mail addressed to the person to whom rent is 
payable, which is Dr. Richard P. Middleton. Ex. P-3, J 12, p. 
15. No such notice was given to Anthony, to Richard P. 
Middleton, nor to the prior counsel for the Middletons, Moyle & 
Draper, with whom prior negotiations had been conducted. Neither 
did Dr. Harry Wong ever mention any complaint about Anthony to 
Dr. Richard G. Middleton (R. at 4909), notwithstanding that they 
continued to work daily in the same hospital, Dr. Wong often 
attending as anesthesiologist in R.G.'s surgeries. R. at 4908. 
Neither the Middletons nor Boyer acceded to MLL's November 
17, 1989 demands. On or about February 16, 1990, MLL filed this 
action against the Middletons. R. at 2. 
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
Over objections raised by Motion in Limine and continued 
through trial, the lower court admitted evidence, claims and 
allegations from a previously settled case to prove its claims in 
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this matter. Admission of such evidence was legally precluded, 
highly prejudicial and plain error. 
MLL failed to properly perfect its breach of contract claims 
by giving notice of breach and a right to cure as required by the 
lease between the parties. Moreover, the lease provides no 
affirmative duty which was breached by Middletons or which was 
sufficient to support implication of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. 
The evidence connecting MLL's damage claim to conduct of the 
Middletons is entirely inference. From the primary facts that 
The Boyer Company did not wish to be involved in litigation and 
Tony Middleton threatened litigation, the jury concluded that the 
threat caused Boyer to refuse MLL's proposed sublease. This 
inference, however, is contradicted and destroyed by direct, 
unrebutted evidence from Roger Boyer and his lawyer. Not only 
did they testify that MLL's unwillingness to compromise and 
inability to obtain financing were indeed the reasons why the 
deal failed, but they also testified that they never intended to 
accept the terms of MLL's proposed sublease. With the inference 
destroyed, MLL has no substantial evidence upon which to sustain 
its causation element and damage calculations. 
The gravamen of MLL's tortious interference claim is a 
"threat of suit" by Tony Middleton. This thin reed supports 
MLL's entire tort and punitive damage claim. As a matter of 
sound public policy, a threat of suit should never be sufficient 
to support a claim unless the threatened suit is first proven to 
be groundless and unfounded. To hold otherwise has a very real 
chilling effect upon the rights of citizens to contemplate and 
utilize the courts of this state for resolution of disputes. 
With a tort as nebulous as interference with a prospective 
economic relationship, not only should citizens be allowed to 
talk about protecting their rights in court but they should be 
privileged to do so as a matter of law. 
Finally, the trial court erred in allowing MLL to both 
recover future rental income and retain possession of the 
property. The Judgment is contrary to the rule of law 
encouraging continuing mitigation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ADMISSION OF MLL'S EVIDENCE REGARDING THE 
ZIONS LAWSUIT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
Several years before commencement of the instant case, Zions 
Bank sued MLL and the Middletons (the "Zions Litigation"). That 
suit was resolved through a Stipulation, Mutual Release of Claims 
and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice entered in March of 1986. 
Exs. P-16, P-17 (See, Appellants' Addendum, Exhibit 8). Prior to 
trial of the present case, Middletons filed Motions In Limine 
seeking to preclude MLL from introducing at trial certain 
testimony and documents pertaining to the Zions Litigation. In 
their Motions In Limine, Middletons argued that evidence relating 
to the claims alleged and factual context of the Zions case was 
precluded on the grounds of relevance, materiality, principles of 
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issue preclusion and operative language in the Mutual Release 
entered between the parties, R. at 1215-17. 
The trial court denied Middletons' Motions In Limine and, 
over Middletons' continuing objections11, allowed MLL to 
introduce into evidence pleadings12, correspondence, and 
deposition testimony from the Zions case and testimony regarding 
the merits of the Middleton claims in that litigation. Allowing 
the introduction of this evidence was plain error, highly 
prejudicial to defendants. 
It is undisputed that the Zions case was settled and 
resolved by means of a Stipulation and Mutual Release Of Claims 
and Order of Dismissal entered among MLL and the Middletons in 
1985.13 Exs. P-16 and P-17 (See, Appellants' Addendum, Exhibit 
8). Paragraph 7 of the Stipulation provides: 
The defendants Middleton. third party 
defendants and Medical Leasing do hereby 
mutually release, acquit and forever 
discharge each other from all claims, causes 
of action alleged in or arising out of. or in 
any way connected with the action referred to 
above, or relating to any delay in commencing 
construction by Zions. Provided, however, 
the Stipulation as to the intent and meaning 
11
 See R. at 4007, 4024, 4042, 4114, 4115. 
Plaintiff8 introduced correspondence, the Complaint, Third Party 
Complaint, Order And Judgment, Answer and Counterclaim, Stipulation And Mutual 
Release of All Claims, and Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
See, Plaintiff's Exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15 and 16. Middletons did 
not object to admission of the Stipulation, Order of Dismissal and Findings of 
Fact. It is the pleadings, testimony, and correspondence relating to facts 
and claims leading up to the Stipulation and resolution of the Zions case to 
which Middletons objected. 
13
 MLL, not Zions, paid Middletons $21,000 to effect settlement. Exs. 
P-16 and P-17 (See. Appellants' Addendum, Exhibit 8). 
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of Paragraph 8 of the Amended ground Lease, 
as set forth in Paragraph 5, herein, is not 
affected by this mutual release. 
Id. [emphasis added.] The Mutual Release between the parties 
plainly precludes MLL from again raising, in support of their 
claims in this case, the underlying facts and assertions of the 
Middleton claims in the Zions case. By allowing introduction of 
MLL's evidence from the old Zions case, the trial court 
effectively allowed MLL to try the Zions case within the 
framework of this action. 
"[Settlements are favored by the law and should be 
encouraged, because of the obvious benefits accruing not only to 
the parties, but also to the judicial system." Murray v. State 
of Utah, 737 P.2d 1000 (Utah 1987) fquoting Tracy-Collins Bank & 
Trust v. Travelstead. 595 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1979)). "[0]ne who 
agrees to settle his claim cannot subsequently seek both the 
benefit of the settlement and the opportunity to continue to 
press the claim he agreed to settle." Kirbv v. Dole. 736 F.2d 
661, 664 (11th Cir. 1984). The settlement agreement is res 
judicata of and bars litigation of "all matters relating to the 
subject matter of the dispute." Rasmussen v. Allstate Insurance 
Co. . 726 P.2d 1251, 1253 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986). rRlecrardless of 
what the actual merits of the antecedent claim may have been, 
they will not be afterward inquired into and examined." 15 
Am.Jur.2d, Compromise and Settlement, § 25 (1976 & Supp. April 
1992) [emphasis added.] 
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The finality and certainty afforded by settlement of a 
lawsuit is perhaps the single most important advantage of 
settlement• Only by ignoring the language of the Mutual Release 
and the well-established policy of encouraging negotiated 
settlement of lawsuits could the court permit MLL to introduce 
its evidence relating to the old claims asserted in the Zions 
case and then allow it to directly attack the merits of those 
claims. 
In fairness to the trial court, it was misled by MLL's 
representations at the commencement of trial. MLL's counsel, Mr. 
Burbidge, stated in support of the admission of evidence relating 
to the Zions litigation: 
I will also/ for clarification, make clear that no 
claims are made in this litigation relating to the 
Zions litigation. That's over. We are simply trying 
to show what the contentions were so we can understand 
what was settled. 
R. at 4115. 
Despite the representations of MLL's counsel at trial, it is 
apparent that MLL presented the pleadings, correspondence and 
testimony relating to the Zions case so it could argue that 
Middletons' claims in the Zions case were unfounded, made in bad 
faith and that the present case was a continuation of that same 
conduct. As MLL admitted in its own Memorandum In Opposition to 
Defendants' Motions For JNOV or New Trial: 
[M]ost of the evidence regarding the Zions litigation 
didn't have anything to do with settlement discussions, 
but rather focused on Richard G. Middleton's admissions 
that the Zions suit was groundless, and that the repeat 
of the same threats of groundless litigation was an 
intentional wrong. 
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R. at 2419. 
MLL argued that the Zions case was evidence of Middleton's 
engagement in an improper course of conduct designed to thwart 
all efforts of MLL to develop the leased property. The merits of 
the claims and defenses asserted by the Middletons in the Zions 
case were argued and repeatedly raised in examination of 
witnesses by MLL in an attempt to establish in this case, breach 
of the Amended Ground Lease, improper conduct, inconsistent 
statements and conduct warranting punitive damages. R. at 4028, 
5032, 5720, 5747, 5749-50, 5818-19 and 5825. 
An example of such improper evidence is the testimony Mr. 
Burbidge elicited from MLL partner Dr. Ring regarding the events 
and discussions that led directly to the Zions lawsuit: 
Q. All right. Tell the jury who spoke and what they 
said. 
A. After we had finished our discussions and we were 
getting up to leave, and just about ready to leave the 
yard, Richard G. jumped up and said, "Just a minute," 
and ran over to us. And he caught John [Adair] and me, 
and he said: "I iust think that maybe I'd better tell 
you to be careful." He said that, "Tony and George 
have never really liked this lease. They don't think 
that Dad did a very good job with it, and they've 
expressed their intention to try and break it." 
R. at 4018. [emphasis added.] 
Mr. Burbidge even went so far as to attack the veracity of 
specific allegations included in the defendants' pleadings in the 
Zions' case. For example, in direct examination of defendant 
Richard G. Middleton, after a colloquy where Mr. Middleton 
testified that he had not read the pleadings in the Zions case, 
the questioning proceeded as follows: 
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Mr. Burbidge: Would you turn to Paragraph 15 — or 
Exhibit 15? Do you see that in front of you? You 
identified it yesterday as the Answer and Counterclaim 
filed on your behalf against Medical Leasing and Zions 
Bank — excuse me, against Medical Leasing and Drs. 
John Adair, his wife, Alice Jane Adair; Wallace H. 
Ring, Harry C. Wong, June A. Wong, John E. Pace and 
Nancy K. Pace. Do you see that? 
A. I see that. 
Q. And if you would be so kind to turn over to page 5 
of that Counterclaim, Paragraph 2, it reads, doesn't 
it, that under the terms of the aforesaid Amended 
Ground Lease, the consent of the Middleton, Defendants, 
is required for any sublease or agreement or contract 
providing for the construction of any building or 
improvement on the premises. Do you see that? 
A. I see that. 
Q. And you knew, whether you [had] read that 
allegation or not, that that allegation was false, 
didn't you? 
Mr. Palmer: I object. 
The Court: Overruled. 
The Witness: That is not the way my understanding is 
of that Amended Ground Lease, no. 
Mr. Burbidge: Exactly. So, do vou still wonder why 
Medical Leasing is not anxious to talk to you about 
other developments on the property. Dr. Middleton? 
R. at 5032. 
If this questioning were not enough, the improper use of 
evidence going directly to the foundation and nature of the 
claims in the Zions suit is further exposed in Mr. Burbidge's 
closing argument where he stated: 
Zions asked: "Is your consent necessary?" and the 
answer was "no." A simple straightforward answer, and 
they wouldn't give it. Hardly the spirit of Paragraph 
12, which says that you have an absolute obligation to 
certify whether you are in compliance with the 
agreement. 
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And so, we take it to R. P. Middleton.14 He says: "I 
don't see any problem with this.11 And then the kids 
and the lawyers get ahold of it. And Zions has to 
bring a lawsuit to get a simple statement of rights 
under the contract. 
And the Middletons file false claims trying to overturn 
the contract. And they invent things that didn't 
happen. R.G. Middleton took the stand, and he agreed, 
that the allegations that I read to him were false, 
[R. at 5720.] 
They go to R. P. Middleton to get consent in the Zions 
deal, and they all jump on the bandwagon, and they all 
file suit. The Zions litigation is informative because 
it demonstrates their willingness, all of their 
willingness, to participate in that kind of an 
activity. [R. at 5747.] 
Medical leasing had the right to sublease without 
interference, without threats, without intimidation, 
without interference, without the false statements made 
in the Zions litigation; and it didn't get what it 
bargained for. And that stopped the deal. There was a 
breach of the Lease. And the damages were substantial. 
[R. at 5749-5750.] 
In Instruction No. 15, it says: "The elements are that 
there was — that he intentionally interfered with 
Plaintiff's existing or potential economic 
relationship." 
No question about that. Tony Middleton, in his diary, 
articulates what the reasonable business expectation 
is. For improper purpose? Absolutely. To get more 
money he was not entitled to. Making false claims. 
Making false claims that he made in Zions. And thereby 
causing economic injury. [R. at 5750.] 
14
 R. P. Middleton is aged and infirm. He did not testify at trial. 
Rather, Mr. Burbidge read portions of his deposition from the Zion's case into 
the record - over the objections of defense counsel. R. at 5693-5700. 
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Zions wanted something. They wanted a statement of the 
truth. MIs vour consent required. Middletons?" And 
the truth was, as R. P. testified: "No." And it cost 
two years and $21.000 to get them to say that 
They shouldn't have to pay $21,000 to get iust an 
honest answer." [R. at 5818-19.] 
[Middletons] hadn't been asked for anything but 
consent. And the answer to consent is the same answer 
that should have been given in good faith in Zions. and 
it wasn't. [R. at 5825.] 
As evidenced by both MLL's own admission and its counsel's 
repeated statements in closing argument, facts alleged in, 
connected to, giving rise to and arising out of the Zions case 
were introduced by MLL in this action to prove elements of its 
claims in this case, including the punitive damage claim against 
Tony Middleton. It is undisputed that the Zions litigation 
terminated in a negotiated, compromise settlement. Both the 
express terms of the Stipulation of settlement and the relevant 
case law preclude MLL from basing any of its claims, even in 
part, upon allegations or evidence that the Middletons' claims in 
the Zions litigation were meritless. It was prejudicial error to 
allow this evidence to be introduced and the verdict, on all 
claims, must therefore be set aside. 
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POINT II 
THE 1980 AMENDED GROUND LEASE 
REQUIRED WRITTEN NOTICE OF DEFAULT AS A 
CONDITION PRECEDENT TO SUIT FOR BREACH OF THE 
LEASE. 
These Middleton appellants hereby adopt by reference the 
argument set forth under Point I, of the co-appellants' Brief 
filed by the law firm of Moyle & Draper. 
POINT III 
THE 1980 AMENDED GROUND LEASE 
DID NOT CONTAIN ANY EXPRESS TERMS REQUIRING 
MIDDLETON8 TO COOPERATE IN DEVELOPMENT OR 
PROHIBITING THEM FROM INTERFERING WITH MLL'S 
EFFORTS TO DEVELOP THE PROPERTY. 
These appellants hereby adopt by reference the argument set 
forth under Points V A. and B. of the co-appellants' Brief. 
George and Jean Middleton adopt by reference the argument set 
forth under Point V C. of that Brief. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AWARDING MLL 
ATTORNEYS FEES. 
These Middleton appellants hereby adopt by reference the 
argument set forth under Point VII, of the co-appellants' Brief. 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
RULING THAT ALL DEFENDANTS WERE JOINTLY AND 
SEVERALLY LIABLE ON THE BREACH OF CONTRACT 
CLAIMS. 
Appellants George W. Middleton and Jean H. Middleton hereby 
adopt by reference the argument set forth under Points II and III 
and IV of the co-appellants' Brief. 
POINT VI 
MLL'8 CLAIMED DAMAGES WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY 
ANY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
The damage evidence MLL presented at trial was based 
entirely on the assumption that, but for Tony Middleton's 
threats, Boyer would have signed the first draft of the sublease 
MLL prepared and delivered to Boyer on February 3, 1989 (or a 
virtually identical sublease) and performed thereunder for its 
50-year duration. R. at 5202-5204. MLL had the burden at trial 
of presenting substantial evidence in support of the damages 
claimed and awarded. For MLL to have met its burden, 
[the] evidence must provide a sufficient 
basis from which the jury could have 
reasonably reached a verdict without 
speculation or drawing unreasonable 
inferences which conflict with the undisputed 
facts. 
Selle v. Gibb. 741 F.2d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Brady v. 
Southern Railway, 320 U.S. 476, 480 (1943)). MA mere scintilla 
of evidence is insufficient to present a question for the jury." 
Boeing Company v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374-375 (5th Cir. 1969); 
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and see Crookston v, Fire Insurance Exchange. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 
1991). 
In essence , MLL argued t o the jury that i t should assume 
t h a t , but for Tony Middleton's a c t i o n s , Boyer would have agreed 
t o and performed under the "wish l i s t " terms of the f i r s t 
sublease draft MLL u n i l a t e r a l l y proposed. This assumption i s not 
a reasonable inference and i s not supported by s u b s t a n t i a l 
evidence. I t i s , in f a c t , contrary t o d i r e c t , competent evidence 
t o the e f f e c t that even the bas ic concept of the Sublease was 
s t i l l being negot iated and would have changed before and through 
the time the Middletons f i r s t learned of Boyer#s involvement in 
the summer of 1989. 
The evidence i s unrebutted that MLL's proposed Sublease 
( P l a i n t i f f ' s Ex. 33) never even got beyond the i n i t i a l draf t . R. 
at 4557. Moreover, in draf t ing that proposed Sublease, MLL's 
at torney, Mr. John Parsons, was not even in contact with Boyer t o 
negot ia te the prov i s ions . R. at 4557. He simply prepared an 
i n i t i a l draft as ins tructed by h i s c l i e n t and de l ivered i t t o 
Boyer for cons iderat ion . Id. Furthermore, MLL did not send 
Boyer the f i r s t draft of a proposed sublease u n t i l February 3 , 
1989, severa l days a f t e r the o r i g i n a l Development Agreement 
expired.1 5 
The t r i a l court ruled that , as a matter of law, the Development 
Agreement expired by i t s terms on January 31, 1989 and, thereaf ter , MLL did 
not have an enforceable contract or l e g a l l y binding development commitment 
with Boyer. R. at 1078 (See. Appellants' Addendum, Exhibit 2 ) . The court ' s 
rul ing was cons i s tent with the express pos i t ion taken e a r l i e r by Boyer in h i s 
lawyer's correspondence of November 22, 1989 and February 5, 1990. Ex.s 30 and 
39. 
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Under questioning by MLL's counsel, Boyer testified that the 
deal being negotiated with MLL after January 1989 would not have 
been the same and would not have included the same rental terms 
as provided for in the 1988 Development Agreement and the 
February 3, 1989 proposed Sublease: 
Q. [by Mr. Burbidge] Do you recall 
negotiations and meetings occurring after 
January having as their purpose the 
negotiations of the Sublease? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. Even though the January 31, 
date had passed? 
A. Yes, it had passed and — without a 
lease being executed. 
Q. All right. But the parties continued 
negotiating the lease? 
A. In good faith, we were trying to come 
together with some agreement, yes. 
Q. And the Sublease — the business terms 
of the Sublease were the same business terms 
as the Development Agreement, correct? 
A. Well, there were numerous negotiations 
that would have changed the terms for 
different permutations on the agreement. It 
would have been several different agreements. 
Q. But in terms of the rent to be paid, do 
you know of that changing? 
A. I think there were some scenarios that 
would have allowed the rent to change, yes. 
Q. That it be escalators? 
A. Or the basic concept of the agreement. 
R. at 4851-4852. (emphasis added). In short, Boyer's testimony 
made it apparent that, after January 1989, the entire deal was up 
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in the air. This testimony is fully consistent with the fact 
that the sublease was never executed. 
Consistent with Mr. Boyer's testimony and contrary to MLL's 
argument, Boyer's counsel, Vic Taylor testified that after 
reviewing the February 3, 1989 proposed sublease, he responded on 
Boyer's behalf by voicing concerns over various significant 
provisions in the draft, including the rent formula, and by 
sending his letter of March 14, 1989, requesting substantial 
changes in the sublease, concessions from the Middletons as well 
as identifying Mmajor business hurdles." R. at 4558; Ex. D-39. 
Mr. Taylor specifically stated in his letter: 
As we have indicated, the foregoing items do 
not constitute all of the substantive areas 
of concern with respect to the sublease, but 
only some of the major business hurdles to be 
resolved before proceeding. 
Id. at p. 4. Mr. Taylor's letter clearly indicates that Boyer 
was not accepting the first draft of the sublease as defining 
"the deal." It was merely a starting point. 
At trial, MLL attempted to make the concerns outlined in Mr. 
Taylor's letter disappear by arguing that Boyer ignored his own 
attorney's advice. MLL's "substantial" evidence in support of 
this was rank hearsay testimony from MLL partner Wally Ring 
regarding a meeting on July 25, 1989 with Roger Boyer, Greg 
Gardner, Vic Taylor and MLL's attorney, John Parsons. R. at 
2378. Dr. Ring testified as follows: 
Q. What did you understand the purpose of this 
meeting in July to be? 
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A. Well, to continue the process of developing this 
lease that we had agreed we were going to sign. 
Q. Did the meeting relate to specific provisions of 
the proposed settlement? 
A. It did. 
Q. All right. Do you recall any specific provisions 
or issues being mentioned, and just answer that "yes11; 
and then, if so, tell me just generally what 
provisions? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. 
A. There were requests that Boyer be provided with 
notice, right to cure, attornment, those are the things 
that I can remember. 
Mr. Burbidge: All right. And with respect to those 
issues, who brought up that on behalf of Boyer? 
A. Vic Taylor. 
Q. And with respect to those issues, did Roger Boyer 
express his view about whether or not those could be 
resolved? 
A. Yes. 
Q. A l l r i g h t . And in that re spec t , what did Roger 
Boyer say? 
Mr. Hunt: Objection: Hearsay.16 
The Court: Overruled. 
The Witness: Boyer sa id that those problems could be 
d e a l t wi th , don't pay any a t t e n t i o n t o h i s a t torney , i t 
was not a point of i s s u e . 
16
 Shortly before t h i s objec t ion , and out of the jury ' s presence, the 
court heard considerable argument by counsel on the hearsay object ions t o t h i s 
test imony, but u l t imate ly allowed the testimony. R. at 4105-4112. 
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Mr. Burbidge: ....What did Mr. Boyer say? 
A. He said: "That's not important. We don't need to 
deal with that. We can work around that. Let's get — 
go ahead and make this deal." He said: "I came here to 
make a deal. I didn't come here to break one." 
R. at 4117-4121. On cross examination by Mr. Palmer, Dr. Ring 
repeated that, at that same meeting, Mr. Boyer told Mr. Taylor 
that there was nothing there "that we can't work around." R. at 
4424. 
MLL presented similar hearsay testimony from its attorney, 
John Parsons, regarding the same July 25, 1989 meeting: 
A. The meeting started with Vic Taylor putting out 
his concerns, the same concerns that he had had over 
the last several months. 
He [Taylor] talked about attornment and nonrecognition, 
talked about consent and he talked about participation. 
Shortly into that discussion, Dr. Ring, who at that 
point was adamantly exercised, stopped him, and with a 
raised voice said, "We are not going to the Middletons. 
We've told you many times we are not going to 
Middletons with any of those things." 
Roger Boyer jumped into the conversation, and, in 
effect, waiving off his lawyer, said, "We are here to 
make a deal, not break a deal. Let's get on with the 
deal"—17 
Mr. Gurmankin: ....[W]hat do you mean in effect waiving 
off his lawyer? 
A. Well we lawyers sometimes get carried away — 
excuse me to the rest of the lawyers in the room— but 
we lawyers sometimes get carried away in negotiating 
transactional propositions for our clients. And what I 
Mr. Palmer interjected here an objection to Mr. Parsons' 
characterization of Mr. Boyer's statement. The objection was overruled. 
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meant by that was — and I'm subject to this too — I 
may be pressing points for my client, my client, in 
effect, tells me: "Stop", and waives me off; "I'm not 
interested in those things." And that's what I 
understood Boyer to be doing, saying : "Stop. I'm not 
interested in those things. We are here to get this 
deal done."18 
R. at 4530-4533. In further hearsay, Mr. Parsons testified that, 
in a June, 1989 telephone conversation, Mr. Gardner, Boyer's 
project manager, told him that Boyer was still interested in the 
property and wanted to make a deal. R. at 4527-28. MLL also 
relies on Mr. Gardner's testimony that he and Mr. Boyer relied on 
their own judgment, rather than their attorney's, where business 
issues were concerned. R. at 4791-4792. 
In spite of MLL's assertions and hearsay, there is simply no 
substantial, competent, admissible evidence in the record that 
Mr. Taylor or Boyer ever withdrew any of their requests or 
concerns regarding the sublease. In fact, the direct evidence 
from these witnesses at trial is that neither Mr. Boyer nor Mr. 
Taylor ever changed their opinions that these financing issues 
and business hurdles had to be addressed. R. at 4876-77. 
Roger Boyer himself specifically testified at trial that he 
believed the items requested in Mr. Taylor's letter were 
necessary to obtain financing and that he did not change his mind 
in that regard: 
Mr. Palmer again objected and moved to strike this testimony, but 
was overruled. Mr. Parson's understanding of what Roger Boyer was doing or 
saying is certainly not competent evidence on the issue of Boyer's intentions 
respecting the deal. 
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Q. [by Mr. Hunt] Did you believe that the 
requirement or the items stated in Mr. 
Taylor's March 14th letter would be necessary 
in order to get some financing on the 
project? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did Mr. Parsons, the attorney for 
Medical Leasing, ever change vour mind about 
whether or not Mr. Tavlor/s concerns would 
have to be addressed in order for you to get 
financing? 
A. Ho. 
R. at 4876-4877. MLL made no attempt to impeach this testimony, 
which came from its own witness. 
Mr. Taylor also testified that his position on the "major 
business hurdles" identified in the March 14, 1989 letter never 
changed despite arguments by MLL and its attorney. Nor did Mr. 
Taylor's position change after he received additional 
information, including the Stipulation entered in the Zions 
litigation. (Exs. P-16, P-17). R. at 5443-44. 
In May of 1989, The Boyer Company contacted Gary Banks, a 
mortgage broker with whom Boyer regularly did business, to seek a 
second opinion on the financeability of the proposed project with 
MLL. R. at 4800-01. Although Mr. Banks believed that the 
project was too complicated to attract financing, he contacted 
Mr. Greg Bell, a lawyer representing commercial lenders and 
familiar with Boyer, to get his input. R. at 5396-99. On May 
30, 1989, Mr. Bell wrote back to Messrs. Banks and Boyer, stating 
his opinion that the project was too complicated to attract a 
lender. Ex. D-18. Mr. Bell specifically stated in his letter 
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that he was in agreement with Vic Taylor's March 14th letter. 
Id. 
When Tony Middleton was first contacted in August, 1989, MLL 
had made no effort to redraft the sublease to accommodate any of 
Boyer's requests or concerns even though it was presented to 
Boyer and his counsel six months before anyone contacted Tony 
Middleton. and despite MLL's repeated requests that Boyer execute 
the sublease. R. at 4199, 4557; Exs. D-30, P-33. 
The only inference which can be drawn is that, before he had 
any communications with Tony Middleton, Boyer had refused the 
deal in the form presented in the draft sublease. MLL went to 
the jury with only this particular "deal" with Boyer and claimed 
it was the only possible productive use for the property and that 
the Middletons did and would prevent every other possible 
productive use on the property. 
MLL has maintained steadfastly that there was a deal with 
Boyer and that "but for" Tony Middleton's alleged threats it 
would have been consummated. As the theory goes, the deal 
embodied in the February 3, 1989 proposed Sublease was alive 
until late September when the alleged threats were made and 
thereafter, everything became a giant salvage operation. The 
theory is clever in its attempt to capture a moment in time and 
attribute all things to it, but it finds no support in the 
evidence. MLL relies upon mere speculation to establish that but 
for Tony Middleton's interference, Boyer would have executed the 
Sublease MLL proposed. This is not enough to sustain the 
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Verdict. See, Gregory v, Fourthwest Investments. Ltd., 754 P.2d 
89 (Utah 1988). 
Any inference to be drawn from the circumstances is, 
moreover, completely destroyed by overwhelming direct evidence to 
the contrary. Selle v. Gibb, supra. The most telling evidence 
comes from Roger Boyer and Vic Taylor. On November 22, 1989, Vic 
Taylor wrote in response to John Parson7s demand letter of 
November 17th and stated: 
Contrary to the statement made in your 
letter, representatives of The Boyer Company 
have not at any time made any representations 
" . . . that the Land Lease would be executed, 
construction commenced, and that the 
Development Agreement would be extended and 
considered enforceable, . . . " (emphasis 
added)• 
Ex. D-30. 
When questioned about this letter, Roger Boyer testified: 
Q. (By Mr. Hunt) Are you taking a look at 
Exhibit D-30, Mr. Boyer? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you receive a copy of that 
letter on or about the time Mr. Taylor sent 
it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you agree with what Mr. Taylor 
stated in that letter? 
A. Yes. 
R. at 4880. 
The direct evidence completely contravenes the inferences 
and hearsay which MLL claims to support its verdict. There was 
no viable deal at any time after the Development Agreement 
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expired, and MLL had stubbornly refused to take the action 
necessary to make the deal financeable and hence acceptable to 
Boyer. To blame this failure on Middletons after the fact is 
nothing more than sleight of hand. It finds no substantial 
support in the record. 
Thus, not only was the jury improperly instructed on the 
theory of damages (as noted infra), but the record contains 
insufficient evidence to justify application of the theory. 
Middletons are entitled to have the judgment below reversed or, 
at the very least, a new trial. 
POINT VII 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, MLL FAILED TO SATISFY THE 
IMPROPER PURPOSE AND IMPROPER MEANS ELEMENTS 
OF ITS TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE CLAIM. 
In Leiah Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 
(Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court adopted the Oregon definition 
of intentional interference with prospective economic relations. 
Leiah. 657 P.2d at 304. That definition was elaborated on in 
Straube v. Larson. 600 P.2d 371, 374 (Ore. 1979) as follows: 
[T]he defendant's improper intent, motive or purpose to 
interfere was a necessary element of the plaintiff's 
case, rather than a lack thereof being a matter of 
justification or privilege to be asserted as a defense 
by the defendant. Thus, to be entitled to go to a 
jury, plaintiff must not only prove that defendant 
intentionally interfered with his business relationship 
but also that defendant had a duty of noninterference' 
i.e., that he interfered for an improper purpose rather 
than a legitimate one or that defendant used improper 
means which resulted in injury to plaintiff. 
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Thus, even i f MLL could e s t ab l i sh in ter ference and causat ion, i t 
must be able t o s a t i s fy one of the a l t e r n a t i v e elements of 
"improper purpose or improper means.H 
A. Improper Purpose 
In determining whether improper purpose e x i s t s , cour ts "look 
to the predominant purpose underlying the defendant 's conduct.11 
Leiah, 657 P.2d a t 307 (c i t ing W. Prosser , Handbook of The Law of 
Tor ts , § 129 a t 943 (4th Ed. 1971)). "A purely malicious motive, 
in the sense of s p i t e and a des i re t o do harm to the p l a i n t i f f 
for i t s own sake, w i l l make the defendant l i a b l e for 
interference. 1 1 i d . Where the defendant has a proper purpose in 
view, however, "the addi t ion of i l l w i l l toward the p l a i n t i f f 
w i l l not defeat h i s p r i v i l e g e . " Id. 
MLL claims t h a t Tony Middletons' improper purpose was "To 
get more money he was not e n t i t l e d t o . " R. a t 5755. To support 
t h i s , MLL points t o Tony Middleton's diary e n t r i e s and testimony, 
and Wally Ring's testimony. R. a t 4361 and 4127-29. All of t h i s 
evidence e s s e n t i a l l y es tabl ished t h a t Tony Middleton's purpose in 
" in t e r f e r ing" was t o obtain addi t iona l money for the 
Middletons.19 There i s no evidence, t h a t Tony Middleton's goal 
Tony Middleton's relevant diary e n t r i e s read as fo l lows: 
Last night I got a hold of Roger a f ter having t r i e d 
through the week without success t o do so and i t turns 
out that Dr. Wong, Ring and Adair are try ing t o get 
the Boyer Company to develop both r e t a i l shops as wel l 
as business o f f i c e s on the property. Roger's company 
i s so strong that they can do without subordination, 
and I suspect we are dead in the water the way that 
stupid contract i s put together by Uncle Dick and 
William Morel. I am going t o meet with Roger t h i s 
coming Tuesday morning t o go over the plans and see i f 
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was anything other than to obtain additional financial gain for 
his family. Such purpose is not sufficiently "improper11 to 
support a tortious interference claim. 
In Leiah, the court found that there was substantial 
evidence that the defendant had deliberately injured the 
plaintiff's economic relations but that injury was only an 
intermediate step toward a "long-range financial goal." Leigh, 
657 P.2d at 308. Because the court concluded that economic 
interest was controlling, it held that the evidence would not 
support a jury finding of improper purpose. Id. 
Thus, to satisfy the improper purpose element, MLL had to 
present substantial evidence to show that the Middletons' 
predominant purpose was to injure MLL. MLL was unable to do so. 
See, Leiah, 657 P.2d at 307 (citing St. Louis-San Francisco 
Railway Co. v. Wade, 607 F.2d 126, 133 (5th Cir. 1979)). The 
evidence adduced at trial instead established that Tony 
Middleton's predominant purpose was financial gain. 
B. Improper Means 
The evidence adduced at trial similarly fails to support a 
finding of the alternative element of "improper means". The 
improper means requirement is satisfied where: 
there is something that can be done about it, but my 
strong hunch is that we are sunk and will have to live 
with the idea that those birds will derive a very 
handsome income off the development without actually 
including the actual owners of the land at all. 
Ex. P-37. 
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the means used to interfere with a party's 
economic relations are contrary to law, such 
as violations of statutes, regulations or 
recognized common-law rules. Such acts are 
illegal or tortious in themselves and hence 
are clearly "improper" means of interference. 
Leiah. 657 P.2d at 308 (citing Searle v. Johnson. 646 P.2d 682 
(Utah 1982)). 
Commonly included among improper means are 
violence, threats or other intimidation, 
deceit or other misrepresentation, bribery, 
unfounded litigation, defamation, or 
disparaging falsehood, [emphasis added.] 
Id. (citing Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 582 
P.2d at 1371, (Ore. 1978), n. 11). 
MLL claims that Tony Middletons/ improper means were his 
threats of suit if the Middletons were not allowed to participate 
financially in the benefits of the development of their own 
property. The evidence at trial demonstrated that Tony Middleton 
said to Boyer that "if there was going to be any development, 
Middletons were entitled to receive some proceeds" and "there was 
a significant possibility that if the property was developed 
without Middleton participation, there would be a suit." R. at 
4361. 
These acts of Tony Middleton are certainly not "illegal or 
tortious in themselves." MLL, however, takes the position that 
the threatened litigation would have been unfounded and therefore 
the threat of suit itself constituted improper means. The 
question for this court is simply whether a threat of suit by one 
party to a contract, without more, can form the basis of the 
- 43 -
other contracting party's tortious interference claim. As a 
matter of law, such threats are not actionable* 
Leiah, suggests, as indicated above, that "threats or other 
intimidation" or "unfounded litigation" may constitute improper 
means. 657 P.2d at 308. The phrases quoted in Leigh actually 
constitute the core conduct of a number of recognized torts. 
They are not simply random descriptions of characteristic 
conduct. In this case, the evidence does establish that Tony 
Middleton threatened litigation. It does not establish that 
there was litigation. It is, in fact, undisputed that no suit 
regarding the proposed Boyer development was ever filed. Whether 
a threat itself is actionable must, obviously, depend on the 
nature of the threat. A threat to bring a legal action in court 
should never be actionable. 
In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 791 
P.2d 587, 590 (Cal. 1990), the Supreme Court of California 
considered the closely analogous issue of "whether it is proper 
to impose liability for inducing a potentially meritorious 
lawsuit." The court concluded: 
[A] plaintiff seeking to state a claim for intentional 
interference with contract or prospective economic 
advantage because defendant induced another to 
undertake litigation, must allege that the litigation 
was brought without probable cause and that the 
litigation concluded in plaintiff's favor. 
Id. at 598. The court noted that its decision was based on 
concern "not to chill the rights to petition the courts for 
redress of grievances." Id. at 597. The Pacific Gas court went 
to explain: 
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The torts of inducing breach of contract and 
interference with prospective economic advantage have 
been criticized as protecting the secure enjoyment of 
contractual and economic relations at the expense of 
our interest in a freely competitive economy. We have 
been cautious in defining the interference torts, to 
avoid promoting speculative claims • . .. Given the 
criticism of these causes of action and the dangers 
inherent in imposing tort liability for competitive 
business practices, we have no motivation to expand 
these torts so that they begin to threaten the right of 
free access to the courts. Our legal system is based 
on the idea that it is better for citizens to resolve 
their differences in court than to resort to self-help 
or force. It is repugnant to this basic philosophy to 
make it a tort to induce potentially meritorious 
litigation. To permit a cause of action for 
interference with contract or prospective economic 
advantage to be based on inducing potentially 
meritorious litigation on the contract would threaten 
free access to the courts by providing an end run 
around the limitations on the tort of malicious 
prosecution. 
Id. at 597-98 [emphasis added and citations omitted.] 
In reaching its decision in Pacific Gas, the California 
Supreme Court approvingly cited the Connecticut Supreme Court's 
decision in Blake v. Levy. 464 A.2d 52, 56 (Conn. 1983). There, 
the Connecticut court adopted elements of a tortious interference 
claim as applied in Utah. Noting that "there is no basis of 
policy for distinction between" tortious interference and 
malicious prosecution claims, the court held that a party 
alleging a tortious interference claim based on unfounded 
litigation must allege and prove termination of the preceding 
suit in its favor. Id. at 56. 
Where courts have held that a party alleging tortious 
interference based on the filing of unfounded litigation must 
allege and prove resolution of the litigation in its favor, it 
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necessarily follows that a mere threat to file unfounded 
litigation is likewise insufficient basis for such a claim. The 
threat to sue is even further removed from resolution of that 
suit. It is repugnant to public policy to discourage potential 
litigants from stating their positions and alleged rights before 
resorting to the courts. 
There is no question that allowing a threat of litigation 
alone to support an interference claim would threaten free access 
to the courts, settlements short of litigation, and even business 
negotiations. Such a result is not only repugnant to sound 
public policy, but also directly contrary to this court's 
pronouncements supporting free access to the courts for redress 
of grievances as guaranteed by the Utah Constitution, Art. 1, § 
11. See. Berry v. Beech Aircraft. 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). 
The instant case exemplifies the dangers recognized in 
Pacific Gas and Blake. After being approached by Boyer regarding 
the proposed development on the Middletons' property, Tony 
Middleton attempted to negotiate for the Middletons to 
participate in the economic benefits of development. Ex. P-37. 
He subsequently told Boyer and Wally Ring that, if development 
proceeded without participation by the Middletons, members of the 
family would probably sue. R. at 4361. The Boyer Company's* 
lawyer, Vic Taylor, believed that the Middletons would, in fact, 
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have a colorable claim if development proceeded as structured in 
MLL's proposed Sublease.20 Exs. D-14 and D-30; R. at 5437-39. 
Although MLL now argues that any suit by the Middletons 
would have been unfounded and frivolous, MLL and Boyer obviously 
weren't willing to stand on that argument at the time. If the 
threats were so obviously frivolous, why didn't MLL and Boyer 
simply proceed with the development as proposed and take their 
chances in court? If they subsequently prevailed in court and 
established that the Middletons claims were in fact frivolous, 
they could then have brought an action for abuse of process. 
One need look no further than the shocking outcome of this 
case — a verdict in excess of $2.5 million dollars — to realize 
the chilling effect MLL's suggested rule of a law would have on 
business negotiations between parties to a contract and on free 
access to the courts. What should Tony Middleton have done when 
Boyer arranged their meeting? Should he have said nothing? Or 
should he have said, flThe Middletons will never sue anyone," 
thereby waiving rights Boyer's own lawyer recognized the family 
might have to challenge the sublease? Under MLL's theory, it 
could have sued the Middletons for silence or any statement other 
than a blanket waiver of rights. MLL placed Tony Middleton in a 
"no win" situation. A situation in which, regardless of Tony's 
zu
 In hie letter of March 14, 1989, Vic Taylor stated that he believed 
the rental structure of the Sublease "violated the letter and spirit" of the 
1980 Amended Ground Lease with the Middletons. Ex. D-14. Mr. Taylor 
subsequently testified at trial that, even after hearing MLL's arguments, he 
never changed his opinion on this issue. R. at 5443-44. 
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response, MLL could effectively blame him for its own failure to 
close its proposed deal with Boyer. 
It is certain that, although MLL and the Middletons are 
still parties to the 1980 Amended Ground Lease, none of the 
Middletons will ever discuss this Lease or any matters regarding 
the subject property with MLL again. Such a result impairs both 
access to the courts and the effective operation of contracts in 
a business setting. 
The judgment on the tortious interference claim should 
accordingly be reversed. 
POINT VIII 
MIDDLETONS, AS OWNERS OF THE SUBJECT REAL 
PROPERTY AND LANDLORDS TO MLL, WERE 
ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED TO INTERFERE IN 
SUBLEASE NEGOTIATIONS. 
The trial court erred in failing to rule, as a matter of 
law, that Middletons were absolutely privileged to interfere in 
MLL's sublease negotiations with Boyer. Privilege is an 
affirmative defense which does not become an issue unless the 
plaintiff is able to establish that "the acts charged would be 
tortious on the part of an unprivileged defendant." Leigh, 657 
P.2d at 304 (citing Top Service, 582 P.2d at 1371). 
This Court has recognized that "even though a defendant's 
action brings about a breach of contract, he is not liable where 
the breach was caused by the doing of an act which he had a legal 
right to do." Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597, 602-603 (Utah 
1962). In Bunnell, this court recognized Prosser's application 
of the rule as follows: 
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If [defendant] has a present, existing economic 
interest to protect, such as the ownership or condition 
of property, or prior contract of his own, or a 
financial interest in the affairs of the person 
persuaded, he is privileged to prevent performance of 
the contract of another which threatens it . . • 
Id. [emphasis added.] 
The chief practical difference between a claim for 
intentional interference with contract and a claim for 
intentional interference with prospective economic relations is 
that "a broader range of privilege to interfere is recognized 
when the relationship . . . interfered with is only prospective." 
Pacific Gas. 791 P.2d at 590; gad, inc. v. ALN Assocs.. Inc.. 757 
F.Supp. 901, 906 (N.D. 111. 1991). This is because the latter 
claim is much more speculative and the interest being protected 
is less certain. As noted above, the trial court granted 
Middletons' Motion for Summary Judgment on MLL's interference 
with contract claim, but submitted the interference with 
prospective economic relations claim to the jury. R. at 1077-79, 
1532. 
Middletons have an existing economic interest of the type 
recognized by Utah courts. Not only are they the fee owners of 
the land which is the subject of MLL's proposed sublease and 
development, (R. at 4216-18) but they have a prior, existing 
lease with MLL. Ex. P-3. Courts have recognized a privilege 
under similar circumstances. In Berafeld v. Stork. 288 N.E.2d 
15, 18 (111. 1972), the court concluded "that a lessor had a 
sufficient economic interest in his property to interfere in a 
sublease that caused a potential purchaser not to buy a tenant's 
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business.11 Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of an economic 
interest more acute than that of a property owner in the 
development of his land or that of a lessor in the lessee's 
compliance with the terms of their lease. 
The trial court erred, in failing to rule that the 
Middletons were privileged as a matter of law. The issue should 
not have been submitted to the jury. Accordingly, the Judgment 
on the tortious interference claim should be reversed. 
POINT IX 
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ERRONEOUSLY 
PERMITTED A DOUBLE RECOVERY AND THE JUDGMENT 
IMPROPERLY RELIEVED MLL OF ITS DUTY TO 
MITIGATE DAMAGES. 
A. The Verdict was Based Upon Improper Damage 
Instructions. 
Jury Instruction No. 29, entitled "Compensatory Damages11 was 
submitted to the jury over Middletons' objections.21 It provided 
in relevant part: 
If, after considering the evidence in this case and the 
instructions I have given, you should find the issues 
in favor of the Plaintiff, then it is my duty to tell 
you what damages the plaintiff would be entitled to 
recover. It would be a sum which you believe, from the 
evidence, will fairly and reasonably compensate the 
Plaintiff for any damage Plaintiff has suffered as a 
proximate result of the Defendants' acts, which 
includes the anticipated profits of which Plaintiff was 
deprived, provided they are not mere speculation. 
Instruction No. 29, R. at 1547 (See, Appellants' Addendum, 
Exhibit 4). 
See, Transcript of Exceptions To Jury Instructions, R. at 5915. 
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The compensatory damage f igure the jury subsequently 
included in the Verdict was presented t o the jury as MLL's 
e x p e r t ' s c a l c u l a t i o n of the present value of the renta l income 
MLL would have rece ived from Boyer i f Boyer had entered a 
sublease as contemplated in the 1988 Development Agreement (Ex. 
P-22) and paid rent thereunder through the year 2040.** MLL's 
expert , Mr. Norman23, further t e s t i f i e d that the damage f igure 
included in the v e r d i c t was based on the assumption that there 
can be no productive use of the property for the remaining 48-
year term of the 1980 Amended Ground Lease. R. at 5204. The 
f a t a l problems with t h i s theory and the i n s t r u c t i o n s are that 
they al low a double recovery and completely r e l i e v e MLL of i t s 
duty t o mi t iga te ongoing damage. 
The j u r y ' s Verdict awarding MLL the present value of the 
next 48 years ' renta l income on the property re leased MLL from 
any incent ive t o r e l e t the premises and l e f t i t with the very 
l i k e l y opportunity t o enjoy a double recovery. The Verdict gave 
MLL the f u l l 48-year value of the Boyer sublease in addit ion t o 
MLL presented i t s damage ca lcu la t ions in Exhibit 47, prepared by Mr* 
Norman. Exhibit 47 s e t forth three a l t ernat ive scenarios: 1) assuming that 
MLL would never be able t o rece ive any income from the property over the 
remaining 48 years under i t s Lease, the present value of MLL's damages was 
ca lculated t o be $2, 582,780 (R. at 5210); 2) assuming that MLL would be able 
t o secure a sublease ten years from the t r i a l date, damages were calculated t o 
$1,419, 049.00 (R. at 5210-11); and 3) assuming MLL secured a sublease f i ve 
years from the t r i a l , damages were calculated t o be $1,005,179.00 (R. at 5215-
16) . The Jury's Verdict accepted the amount presented in scenario No. 1. R. 
at 1574. 
23
 Mr. Norman presented himself as an expert in accounting and f inance. 
R. at 5241-42. 
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all benefits of the possession and control of the property for 
the next 48 years. 
It is axiomatic that the law abhors double recovery of 
damages. Restatement (Second) of Property, S 10.2, provides 
that: "damages may include one or more of the following items as 
may be appropriate so long as no double recovery is involved 
...."[emphasis added]. See, also. Ancrelos v. First Interstate 
Bank of Utah. 671 P.2d 772, 778 (Utah 1983); Ohio Casualty Ins. 
Co. v. Brundacre, 674 P.2d 101 (Utah 1983). 
Although MLL argued that, as a result of Tony Middleton's 
threat of litigation in 1989, the property could not be put to 
any economically beneficial use for the remaining 48 years under 
the lease, such a notion is patently absurd. MLL's own expert, 
Henry Schwendiman, testified that this property, which is zoned 
C-2 is located at "one of the top ten intersections in the 
state." R. at 5094. Furthermore, the transcript of a meeting on 
February 15, 1990 (after the filing of this lawsuit) between 
Boyer and MLL established that, even after commencement of this 
lawsuit, Boyer was still interested in doing some kind of 
development on the property. R. at D-58. Any economically 
beneficial use of the property, whether as a parking lot, 
Christmas tree lot or office building, would result in a windfall 
or double recovery to MLL.24 
Illustratively, Middletons' counsel, by chance, noticed that a 
Christmas tree lot was, in fact, in business on the subject property in 
December, 1992, and the Boyer Company still had a nTo Lease" sign on the 
property. 
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B. The Judgment Improperly Relieved MLL of its Ongoing 
Duty to Mitigate Damages. 
In Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896 
(Utah 1988), this Court addressed the very problem presented by 
the verdict in this case. The rule the Court adopted provides: 
[I]f the trial occurs before the end of the 
lease term, a judgment cannot be entered for 
rents that have not yet accrued; any damage 
award must be limited to taking account only 
of rents that have accrued as of the trial 
date. To recover for later accruing rents, 
the landlord must bring a supplemental 
proceeding or proceedings in which it can 
prove that additional rents have accrued and 
that reasonable efforts to mitigate those 
losses have been taken. 
Id. at 906. Only such a rule ensures, as to the party in 
possession, that "serious efforts are made to redeploy the rental 
property in a productive fashion by those who are best able to 
accomplish that end and who are best able to prove that required 
mitigation efforts have been carried out.11 Id. 
[W]hen the [lease] term has not expired by 
the time of trial, it is impossible to 
evaluate the mitigation efforts the landlord 
will have to make in the future with respect 
to rents that have not yet come due, and it 
is equally impossible to determine whether 
those efforts will be successful in reducing 
losses from future accruing rents. Some 
means must be devised to permit recovery of 
actual losses occasioned by future accruing 
rents while ensuring that the landlord 
fulfills its duty to mitigate losses. 
Id. at 907. 
To avoid both the possibility of a double recovery and to 
encourage ongoing mitigation and development of the property by 
MLL, Middletons expressly requested a jury instruction consistent 
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with the rule of the Reid case. R. at 1505, 1512-13. When the 
trial court declined to accept Middletons' requested damage 
instruction, Middletons specifically objected on the record to 
the damage instruction given for its failure to comply with Reid. 
R. at 5914-15.* 
Recognizing that the Verdict allowed MLL a v ir tual ly certain 
double recovery and provided no other incentive to put the 
subject commercial property to beneficial use, the t r i a l court 
made a well- intentioned, but flawed attempted to remedy the 
s i tuat ion by including in the Judgment provisions allowing the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of some future income from the property being paid 
back to the Middletons. In denying Middletons' pos t - t r ia l 
motions, Judge Rigtrup noted his concerns: 
The prospect of a 2.6 — roughly — mill ion dollar judgment and the further prospect of landlocking the 
use of the land for 48 years i s not, i t seems to the 
Court, a good resul t . There might be those who think 
the property would best be u t i l i z ed by greenbelting i t , 
maybe. But the Court in the Reed [ s i c ] case suggested 
Counsel, Mr. Frankenburg, presented Middletons' exceptions t o the 
jury ins truc t ion on damages: 
We a l s o take exception t o Instruct ion No. 29, and object t o that 
i n s t r u c t i o n . That i s the compensatory damages i n s t r u c t i o n . The 
grounds for our objec t ions t o that ins truct ion are: What we have 
in t h i s case are claims made by the P l a i n t i f f s for l o s s of 
projected income from a l ease of rea l property. And by f a i l i n g t o 
ins truct the jury that compensatory damages must be l imited t o 
those proven t o have accrued as of the date of t r i a l , the Court i s 
allowing P l a i n t i f f s a p o s s i b l e double recovery, f a i l i n g t o 
encourage mit igat ion and f a i l i n g t o encourage the economic 
development of rea l property in accordance with publ ic p o l i c y . 
And, in support of t h i s objec t ion , we c i t e the Reid v. Mutual of 
Omaha case , the Utah Supreme Court case from 1986, at 776 P.2d 
896. 
R. at 5914-15. 
R. at 5915. On Behalf of Richard G. Middleton, et al., Mr. Palmer joined in 
this objection. R. at 5914. 
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that that was not good public policy. And since the 
property is zoned Commercial, the Court doesn't view 
that as appropriate public policy. 
R. at 2915 (See, Appellants' Addendum, Exhibit 5). 
After reaching the puzzling conclusion that Reid did not 
apply because this case involved "loss of future profits . . . 
through the vehicle of rents" and is "not a case of rents," (R. 
at 2916) Judge Rigtrup nonetheless ordered: 
But to avoid the possibility of the property being tied 
up, the Court will require in the order that the Court 
have continuing jurisdiction in this case should any 
development plan come forward. And the Court reserves 
the option of treating that in the way of mitigation of 
the awarded damages. 
R. at 2920. He further clarified that this would not affect 
MLL's ability to collect the Judgment. Id. 
Pursuant to the trial court's ruling the final Judgment 
provided: 
It Is Further Hereby Ordered that notwithstanding the 
finality of the judgment, the court shall retain 
jurisdiction of this matter in the following limited 
respect: In the event that either Plaintiff or 
Defendants obtain a development agreement for the 
undeveloped portion of the subject property during the 
period of time that the subject Amended Ground Lease is 
in effect on said property, Defendants may apply to the 
court for consideration of whether and to what extent 
they may share in any proceeds from such development 
agreement as credit against the final judgment. 
R. at 2966. 
Thus, although the trial court properly recognized the 
concept of retained jurisdiction, it erroneously omitted the most 
important steps - limiting the current Judgment to damages 
accrued as of the date of trial, and concurrently imposing a duty 
of mitigation on the party in possession. Despite the trial 
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court's intentions, its ruling and consequent modification of the 
Judgment clearly serves to completely relieve MLL of all 
incentive to fulfill its ongoing duty to mitigate! By awarding 
MLL a final judgment including all its claimed rental income 
through the end of the Lease26, the court quite effectively 
relieved MLL of any duty to mitigate its damages for the 
remaining 48 years under the lease. Obviously, if MLL collects 
the judgment, it has absolutely no incentive to relet the 
property, as the court might then require some, or all, of the 
rental proceeds to be passed on to the Middletons. R. at 2920-21 
and 2966. 
The Middletons, who might stand to receive a benefit if the 
property is relet, are not in possession and thus are unable to 
put the property to any beneficial use. They can't employ a 
realtor or make a single commitment to a prospective tenant 
without the concurrence of MLL and the court - which neither are 
required to give. This unworkable situation exemplifies the 
mischief which results when the policy of mitigation is turned on 
its head. 
The concept of mitigation of damages is grounded in 
traditional contract law principles and requires that ffa party 
injured by contract breach may not recover damages that he or 
she, with reasonable effort, could have avoided. Reid, 776 P.2d 
at 906, n. 8. It is well established that a repossessing 
It should also be noted that MLL also has the significant benefit of 
interest on this award, at the rate of 12% per annum, until paid. 
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landlord has a duty to mitigate its losses through taking 
commercially reasonable action, which usually means seeking to 
relet the premises. Reid, at 906. 
In Reid this Court recognized: 
[T]he economies of both the state and the 
nation benefit from a rule that encourages 
the reletting of premises, which returns them 
to productive use, rather than permitting a 
landlord to let them sit idle while it seeks 
rents from the breaching tenant. 
776 P.2d at 905. 
In the instant case, MLL is both a tenant and a landlord. 
Its alleged loss arises solely out of its claimed lost rental 
income as a landlord to Boyer. R. at 5255. The only evidence in 
the record concerning the subject of mitigation establishes that 
MLL took no steps as a landlord to sublease the property to 
anyone other than Boyer. Dr. Wong testified that MLL had made no 
effort to find a subtenant or developer other than Boyer: 
Q. [by Mr. Frankenburg] Isn't it true, Dr. 
Wong, that neither you nor your partners have 
made any attempt, since January of 1990, to 
find another tenant, other than The Boyer 
Company, or another developer, for the 3900 
South property? 
A. It is true we have not sought to get 
anyone else to develop the property. 
Q. And the same is true since September of 
1989, isn't it? 
A. That's correct. 
R. at 4937-4938. This testimony was direct, unrebutted and met 
the traditional defense burden of initial proof on the issue of 
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mitigation. Dr. Ring testified as well that no efforts were made 
to re-let the premises. R. at 5046. 
This case, just like Reid, involves a landlord suing for 
unpaid rent. It is undisputed that the tort and contract damages 
MLL claimed at trial were based entirely on calculated lost 
rental income MLL argued it would have received from Boyer over a 
50 year period. MLL's expert, Mr. Norman, who formulated the 
damage calculations presented to the jury testified as follows: 
Q. fAlll your calculations are based upon income from 
fthe] lease, right? 
A. Income from the Lease? 
Q. Right. 
A. Income as contemplated from the Boyer lease, yes. 
Q. Rental Income? 
A. That is correct. 
R. at 5255. That the Middletons are also landlords and not 
tenants is immaterial. As the party in possession, MLL's duty to 
mitigate is the same in either case. 
What distinguishes Reid from other cases involving lost 
profits is that in Reid, the claimed lost profits were in the 
form of real property rents. The Utah Supreme Court expressly 
approved of public policy considerations which apply equally to 
any case which involves "lost profits" from real estate rental: 
[W]e find persuasive the reasons advanced in support of 
the trend rule requiring the landlord to mitigate its 
losses. For example, the economies of both the state 
and the nation benefit from a rule that encourages the 
reletting of premises, which returns them to productive 
use . . . . 
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Id. at 905. 
Like any other landlord, MLL has a duty to mitigate by 
returning the property in its possession to productive use. The 
retained jurisdiction approach adopted in Reid is designed to 
encourage the fulfillment of this duty. 
This approach, therefore, should provide an incentive 
to the landlord to see that its mitigation duty is 
fulfilled, lest it be denied some of the damages it 
would otherwise be entitled to. 
Id. at 908. 
On the issue of damages, th i s case i s indistinguishable from 
Reid. Whether the defendants are breaching tenants or in some 
other posit ion i s of no significance. The policy rationale i s 
the same wherever the p la int i f f seeks damages for l o s t future 
rent from real property of which i t retains possession. 
MLL has, in an effort to circumvent the requirements of 
Reid, argued that the jury already determined that mitigation was 
impossible. This, however, i s exactly the type of theory which 
Reid i s spec i f i ca l ly designed to preclude. Reid recognizes that 
such a theory can only be based on highly speculative evidence 
and would improperly re l ieve the p la int i f f of i t s ongoing duty to 
mitigate.27 
Referring t o the retained j u r i s d i c t i o n approach, the Court in Reid 
s ta ted: 
This approach does not depend on speculat ive project ions of future 
events that mav lead t o under- or overestimation of the landlord's 
l o s s e s . 
[emphasis added.] 776 P.2d at 908. 
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This Court has expressly stated the rule which must be 
applied to encourage ongoing mitigation. The trial court erred 
in failing to instruct the jury that it could not award MLL any 
future damages and in including in the Judgment provisions 
relieving MLL of any incentive to mitigate. This Court should 
remand for a new trial to correct the error in the jury 
instructions and instruct the trial court to fully apply retained 
jurisdiction consistent with Reid. 
POINT X 
NIDDLETONS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR ATTORNEYS 
FEES PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 16 OF THE 1980 
AMENDED GROUND LEASE. 
The 1980 Amended Ground Lease, 1 16, provides: 
16. Attorney's Fees. If landlord or tenant default 
hereunder or file a suit against the other which is in 
any way connected with this lease, the defaulting party 
shall pay to the prevailing party a reasonable sum for 
attorney's fees, which shall be deemed to have accrued 
on the commencement of such action and shall be 
enforceable whether or not such action is prosecuted to 
judgment. 
Exhibit P-3, f 16. 
In other words, a defendant may recover if the plaintiff 
pleads but fails to prove a breach of an express provision of the 
Lease. In that situation, there is no default, but defendant is 
the prevailing party in a suit" in any way connected with the 
lease. •• 
Middletons therefore request that this Court grant them 
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in defending those claims the 
Court resolves in their favor. 
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CONCLUSION 
This appeal presents error in at least three fundamental 
areas where sound legal and policy considerations mandate 
reversal. 
The policy of finality upon which settlement of cases 
depends, and which in turn, administration of justice relies, is 
flaunted by the admission of the Zions evidence in the court 
below. Its admission prejudiced the jury and effectively led to 
re-trial of the Zions case within the framework of this action. 
Prejudicial error resulted. 
The policy requiring mitigation of damages and fostering 
beneficial use of realty was ignored by the lower court,s damage 
instruction. Disguised by the rubric that MLL's damages were 
"future profits11 not rents, the trial court circumvented the rule 
of the Reid case and the important policies which it furthers. 
This court should require the lower court to follow the rule in 
Reid to foster the important policies the case encourages. 
There exists no more important policy in our form of 
government than preserving and facilitating the resolution of 
disputes through the courts. Chilling those rights by 
discouraging would-be litigants from using the process promotes 
far less civilized methods of dispute resolution contrary to the 
public interest. It would be grave error for this court to allow 
a "threat of suit", standing alone, to form the core of a 
business tort upon which a multi-million dollar judgment rests. 
To allow such a judgment to stand sends precisely the wrong 
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message. That message is: Don't use the system to defend your 
rights - resort to other means - the system isn't safe. This 
court can and must send the opposite message. This court must 
say: Using the system or threatening to use the system is a safe 
harbor; until abuse of the system is established, it is safe to 
use. Without such a message, Utah's constitutional provision 
guaranteeing open courts for redress of grievances will be hollow 
rhetoric indeed. 
These Appellants hereby request that the Judgment of the 
lower court be reversed, or in the alternative, that they be 
granted a new trial and that they be awarded their attorney's 
fees and costs on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of February, 1993. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
By 
& GEORGE A . i f W T 
KURT M. FRAJ/KENBURG 
AttorneysMfor Defendants 
Anthony W. Middleton, Carol S. 
Middleton, George W. Middleton 
and Jean H. Middleton 
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